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1.  Introduction 
Banking sector outreach varies significantly across countries.  In Ethiopia there is less 
than one branch per 100,000 people, while in Spain there are 96.  In Albania, there are four loans 
per 1,000 people and the average loan size is 15 times GDP per capita, while in Poland there are 
774 loans per 1,000 people and the average size of loans is only one third of GDP per capita.  
This paper is a first attempt at measuring outreach and at investigating its determinants. First, we 
present new indicators of banking sector outreach across 99 countries, constructed on the basis of 
aggregate banking data provided by bank regulators. Second, we show that our indicators closely 
predict harder to collect micro-level statistics of household and firm use of banking services and 
are associated with measures of firm financing obstacles in the expected way. Finally, we 
explore the association between our outreach indicators and standard determinants of financial 
sector depth.  
To date, the literature on financial sector development has focused on measuring, 
assessing the determinants, and evaluating the economic impact of financial sector depth, 
commonly represented by the ratio of private sector credit to GDP.
1  In contrast, perhaps due to a 
dearth of adequate data (see Honohan 2004b), little is known about the breadth or outreach of 
financial systems across countries, their determinants, and their impact on desirable development 
outcomes.
2  
The importance of broad financial services outreach can be justified in several ways.  The 
first argument builds on the theoretical and empirical finance and growth literature, as surveyed 
by Levine (2005) and the importance of a well-developed financial system for economic 
development and poverty alleviation (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2004 and Honohan 
                                                 
1 See Levine (2005) for a review of this literature.   
2 While there are numerous country case studies on measuring access to financial services (and in some cases its 
consequences) at the household and/or firm level, there are no systematic cross country comparisons of access to 
finance. See Claessens (2006) for an overview.   3 
 
2004a).  Financial market imperfections such as informational asymmetries, transactions costs 
and contract enforcement costs are particularly binding on poor or small entrepreneurs who lack 
collateral, credit histories, and connections.  Without broad access, such credit constraints make 
it difficult for poor households or small entrepreneurs to finance high-return investment projects, 
reducing the efficiency of resource allocation and having adverse implications for growth and 
poverty alleviation (Galor and Zeira, 1993).
3  Second, one of the channels through which 
financial development fosters economic growth is through the entry of new firms (Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan, 2006) and the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction.”  This implies 
that talented newcomers have access to the necessary financial services, including external 
finance.  Access to finance for large parts of the population is thus seen as important to expand 
opportunities beyond the rich and connected and also as crucial for a thriving democracy and 
market economy (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  Third, access to finance can also have important 
effects on technological progress and the generation of ideas, since without the perspective that 
ideas will be financed, individuals in the economy will have little incentive to think creatively 
(King and Levine, 1993).  Finally, access to finance can be seen on a similar level as access to 
basic needs such as safe water, health services, and education (Peachey and Roe, 2004). 
Access to financial services, however, is not synonymous to the use of financial services.  
Economic agents might have access to financial services, but might decide not to use them, 
either for socio-cultural reasons, or because opportunity costs are too high.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to carefully distinguish between two different concepts when discussing financial 
                                                 
3 Capital market imperfections are at the core of theoretical models that show redistributing wealth from the rich to 
the poor would enhance aggregate productivity and therefore growth.  In the absence of well-functioning capital 
markets and broad access to financial system, it is this wealth redistribution that creates investment opportunities.  
See Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997).  4 
 
sector outreach, namely: (i) access and the possibility to use financial services and (ii) actual use 
of financial services.
4 
In order to characterize banking sector outreach across countries, this paper introduces 
two classes of indicators that correspond to the different concepts of access to and use of 
financial services. Specifically, we present data across developed and developing countries on 
the number of branches and ATMs relative to population and area, to capture the geographic and 
demographic penetration of the banking system. Data on the number of branches is available for 
98 countries and statistics on the number of ATMs was obtained for 89 countries. We interpret 
higher branch and ATM intensity in demographic and geographic terms as indicative of higher 
possibilities of access and the opportunity to use financial services by households and 
enterprises.   
To measure the actual use of deposit and credit services, we present indicators on the 
number of loan and deposit accounts relative to population and on the average loan and deposit 
sizes relative to GDP per capita. Loan data is available for 44 countries, while data on deposits 
was obtained for 54 countries.  We interpret higher number of loan and deposit accounts per 
capita and lower average loan and deposit amounts relative to GDP per capita as indicating use 
of deposit and credit services by a greater share of the population and by “smaller” clients. 
We conduct a number of “reality checks” to establish the validity of our indicators as 
measures of outreach. In particular, we show that our aggregate and admittedly crude indicators 
of outreach are good predictors of measures of outreach based on hard to collect  micro data, 
such as the share of households with bank accounts and the share of small firms with bank loans.  
Thus, in the absence of survey measures on the use of deposit and loan services for a broad 
cross-section of countries, our aggregate indicators provide an adequate approximation of the 
                                                 
4 Also see the discussion in Beck and de la Torre (2006).  5 
 
extent to which household and firms use deposit and loan services, respectively. Also, 
reassuringly, we are able to show that our outreach indicators are associated with perception-
based measures of firm financing obstacles in the expected way – in countries with greater 
outreach firms report facing lower financing obstacles.  
The final part of our empirical analysis explores cross-country variations in outreach. In 
particular, we examine whether outreach is associated with the same factors that are found to 
drive financial sector depth.  Our findings reveal that both outreach and depth indicators are 
positively associated with the overall level of economic development, the quality of the 
institutional environment, the degree of credit information sharing, the level of initial 
endowments, and the development of the physical infrastructure. At the same time, outreach and 
depth indicators are negatively correlated with the cost of enforcing contracts and the degree of 
government ownership of banks. However, only financial sector depth is positively associated 
with the level of creditor rights protection. Finally, historical variables, such as legal origin and 
religion have a less consistent impact on financial outreach relative to depth. In particular, 
economies with a French legal origin seem to have lower levels of depth, but not consistently 
lower levels of outreach. Similarly, while predominantly protestant societies appear to have 
deeper financial sectors than catholic societies, the same cannot be said consistently about 
banking sector outreach.  
Notwithstanding the novelty of these indicators of financial access and use, it is important 
to be cognizant of the limitations of this data collection effort.  First, unlike indicators used in the 
finance and growth literature, to date, our data are only available at one point in time.  This 
prevents us at this stage from exploring the relationship between financial outreach and 
economic development over time and from exploiting within-country variation in banking 
system outreach.  Second, our data and analysis focus exclusively on two banking services,  6 
 
deposit-taking and lending, and thus abstract from other important financial services, such as 
payment and insurance, for which data have proven more difficult to obtain.  In addition, we 
concentrate on banks and, therefore, do not take into account other financial service providers, 
such as microfinance institutions or cooperatives, due to the scarcity of data on these institutions.  
Third, our indicators are crude quantity-based indicators of outreach that ignore new delivery 
channels of financial services, fail to consider the costs of accessing and using banking services, 
and are unable to capture differences in the size and geographical (urban versus rural) 
distribution of loans and deposits.  Also, the proposed indicators might be subject to 
measurement error. In particular, failure by poor or dysfunctional economies to measure outreach 
adequately might be problematic, since it might lead to a disproportionate downward bias in 
measured access and an overstating of the economic consequences of improved outreach.
5 
Finally, our indicators measure equilibrium outcomes, affected by both demand and supply 
factors.  
Despite these shortcomings, we see this data compilation effort and the associated 
analysis as a useful and important first step towards developing more accurate indicators of 
access to and use of financial services. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  
Section 2 describes the data collection process and introduces our indicators of outreach.  Section 
3 discusses the cross-country variation in outreach.  Section 4 presents a number of reality 
checks to show the validity of our data. In particular, we demonstrate the predictive power of our 
indicators relating them to household- and firm-survey based statistics on financial services use 
and also show that our indicators are associated with perception-based measures of firm 
financing obstacles as expected.  Section 5 examines the association between the outreach 
                                                 
5 This measurement error seems to be more of a problem in the case of loan and deposit accounts than in the case of 
physical branch and ATM outlet, as the latter are easier to verify by supervisory entities than the former.    7 
 
indicators and country characteristics that have been found to affect financial sector depth.   
Section 6 concludes and offers directions for future research. 
 
2.  Data: indicator sources and definitions 
This paper presents a new data set that seeks to measure access to and use of banking 
services across 99 countries in 2003-2004.  To gather this data, we developed a questionnaire 
that we circulated among bank regulatory agencies across countries.  The main questions from 
this survey focus on obtaining information on the number of bank branches, number of ATMs, 
and the aggregate number and value of bank loans and deposits.
6  For countries that did not 
provide responses to our questionnaire, we gathered data from alternative sources, including 
government publications and official websites.  A detailed list of all the sources used for each 
country can be found in appendix Table A.1. 
Our survey refers exclusively to deposit money banks – all financial institutions that have 
“liabilities in the form of deposits transferable by check or otherwise usable in making 
payments” (IMF 1984, p. 29) - for two main reasons.  First, in a majority of countries, the 
banking sector intermediates most of the funds in the economy.  Second, the banking sector is 
regulated and statistical information for this sector is easier to obtain and better in quality than 
data for other non-bank financial service providers (such as credit unions, cooperative, finance 
companies, and microfinance institutions), which are often not regulated. 
Using data gathered through our survey of bank regulatory bodies and from other 
sources, we put together the following indicators of banking sector outreach: 
1-  Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1,000 km
2 
                                                 
6 We also included questions on payment transactions (value and number) and on the size distribution and 
rural/urban split of bank loans and deposits.  However, most countries were unable to provide answers to these 
questions; hence it is not possible to conduct a systematic analysis of these data.  8 
 
2-  Demographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 100,000 people  
3-  Geographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 1,000 km
2 
4-  Demographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 100,000 people 
5-  Loan accounts per capita: number of loans per 1,000 people 
6-  Loan-income ratio: average size of loans to GDP per capita 
7-  Deposit accounts per capita: number of deposits per 1,000 people 
8-  Deposit-income ratio: average size of deposits to GDP per capita 
Indicators (1) through (4) measure outreach of the financial sector in terms of access to 
banks’ physical outlets.  The data for each of these indicators, across 98 countries in the case of 
branches and 89 countries in the case of ATMs, are shown in Table 1.
7  The indicators of 
branches and ATMs per square kilometer help characterize the geographic penetration of the 
banking sector.  They can also be interpreted as proxies for the average distance of a potential 
customer from the nearest physical bank outlet.  Higher geographic penetration would thus 
indicate smaller distance and easier geographic access.  Per capita measures of branches and 
ATMs are used to capture the demographic penetration of the banking sector.  They proxy for 
the average number of people served by each physical bank outlet.  Higher demographic 
penetration would indicate fewer potential clients per branch or ATM and, therefore, easier 
access.  
Indicators (5) through (8) measure the use of banking services.  We focus exclusively on 
bank deposits and loans because these are the main services offered by banks for which we were 
able to gather information across countries.  In particular, we collected information on the 
number and value of loans for 44 countries, and information on the number and value of deposits 
for 54 countries.  This information is shown in Table 2.  We interpret higher figures of indicators 
                                                 
7 For reference, this table also shows the ratio of private credit to GDP to measure financial sector depth and the 
level of GDP per capita to proxy for economic development in each country.  9 
 
based on the number of loans and deposits to signal greater use of services.  On the other hand, 
we interpret higher values for the average size of loans or deposits to GDP per capita to indicate 
that banking services are more limited in use, since they are likely only to be affordable to 
wealthier individuals or larger enterprises. 
Despite the fact that our outreach indicators are easy to understand and interpret, they are 
not without specific shortcomings, aside from the general limitations discussed above. In 
particular, area- and population-based ratios of the number of branches and ATMs assume a 
uniform distribution of bank outlets within a country’s area and across its population, while in 
most countries bank branches and ATMs are concentrated in urban areas of the country and are 
accessible only to some individuals. At the same time, because one individual or firm may 
receive more than one loan or have more than one deposit account, the number of loans and 
deposit accounts is far from being a perfect proxy of the number of people that use these services 
in a country.  Also, the average size of loans and deposits to GDP per capita might not be 
representative of the value of services that a typical individual might receive.  Nevertheless, in 
the next section we show how these indicators are correlated with the underlying statistics we 
care about – the actual percentage of households and firms that use banking services in a 
country. 
 
3.  Characterizing access to and use of banking services across countries 
  Indicators of banking outreach vary sharply across countries.  Table 3 Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics for all outreach indicators. The number of branches per area varies from less 
than 0.18 branches per 1,000 square kilometers (the lowest 5
th percentile of the distribution) for 
Bolivia, Botswana, Guyana, Kazakhstan, and Namibia to more than 119.65 branches per 1,000 
square kilometers (the top 5
th percentile of the distribution) for Bahrain, Belgium, Malta,  10 
 
Netherlands, and Singapore.  The median number of branches per 1,000 square kilometers is 
4.80, which is representative of the values for Estonia and Sweden.  
Ethiopia, Honduras, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda have less than 1.24 branches per 
100,000 people (bottom 5
th percentile), while Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain have 
more than 49.74 branches per 100,000 people (top 5
th percentile).  The median figure for the 
number of branches per 100,000 people is 8.42.  Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Colombia, Kuwait, and 
Poland have indicators close to this value.   
In terms of number of ATMs per area, Tanzania, Zambia, Nepal, Madagascar, and 
Guyana are at the bottom of the distribution with less than 0.26 ATMs per 1,000 square 
kilometers, while the top 5
th percentile includes Korea, Malta, Bahrain, Japan, and Singapore 
with more than 253.12 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers.  The median for the number of ATMs 
per 1,000 square kilometers is 10.07 and Sri Lanka and Costa Rica are close to this value. 
The number of ATMs per 100,000 people is lowest for Bangladesh, Nepal, Madagascar, 
Pakistan, and Tanzania, with less than 0.58 ATMs per 100,000.  On the other hand, Canada, 
Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the United States have more than 101.46 ATMs per 100,000 people.  
The median value for this indicator is 16.63, representative for Mexico, Malaysia, Lebanon, 
Thailand, and Venezuela.   
The median value of the number of loans per capita is 80.57 loans per 1,000 people, with 
the values for Peru, Ecuador, Jordan and Namibia close to this figure.  The lowest 5
th percentile 
of the distribution is 6.35 loans per 1,000 people, including Albania, Uganda, and Madagascar.  
The top 5
th percentile of this distribution includes countries with more than 700.56 loans per 
1,000 people, such as Greece, Israel, and Poland. 
The median value across countries of the loan-income ratio is 3.75, representative for 
Lithuania and Singapore.  The top 5
th percentile for this indicator is 17.91 and includes Belgium,  11 
 
Madagascar, and Bolivia.  On the other hand, the bottom 5
th percentile is 0.68 and includes El 
Salvador, Turkey, and Poland.   
In terms of the number of deposits per capita, the median value of this indicator is 529 
deposit accounts per 1,000 people, representative for Guyana and Venezuela.  The top 5
th 
percentile of the distribution for this indicator is 2,569, (that is, more than 2.5 deposit accounts 
per capita) which includes Austria, Belgium, and Denmark.  The bottom 5
th percentile has fewer 
than 62 deposit accounts per 1,000 people, among them Bolivia, Madagascar, and Uganda. 
For fifty percent of countries in our sample, the deposit-income ratio is below 0.66; 
Argentina, Turkey, and Ecuador are close to this value.  The top 5
th percentile for the distribution 
of the average size of deposits to GDP per capita is 6.40, including Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and 
Lebanon.  On the other hand, with a deposit-income ratio below 0.11, values for Russia, Iran, 
and the Dominican Republic fall in the lowest 5
th percentile of the distribution of this ratio. 
Panel B of Table 3 and Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show a positive association between GDP 
per capita and indicators of the number of branches, ATMs, loans, and deposits.  This table along 
with Figure 1d also show that both loan-income and deposit-income ratios are negatively 
correlated with GDP per capita, although not significantly at the 5% level in the case of loans.
8  
At the same time, indicators of the number of banking outlets and loan and deposit accounts tend 
to be positively correlated with each other and with the standard measure of financial sector 




                                                 
8 The insignificant correlation between GDP per capita and loan-income ratio might be due to better access to 
mortgage loans with economic development, which might offset the negative impact of GDP per capita on average 
loan-income ratio.  12 
 
4.  Conducting “reality checks” on the proposed outreach indicators 
  To a large degree the validity and usefulness of the aggregate banking sector outreach 
indicators we propose will depend on whether they track measures of outreach based on 
household or firm level surveys which are much harder to obtain and update. Thus, we conduct 
some simple “reality checks” to justify the use of our indicators in the absence of micro-level 
measures.  
  First, we examine the correlation between user-based data from household and firm 
surveys and our indicators of deposit and loan use and we run regressions to test whether our 
aggregate outreach indicators are useful in predicting these observable micro-level data on 
outreach.
9  Second, we regress perception-based measures of firm financing constraints on our 
outreach indicators to determine whether our indicators relate to the severity of financing 
obstacles in the expected way, namely, whether in countries with greater outreach firms report 
facing lower financing obstacles.
10  
The country-level data we use on the percentage of households that have a bank account 
was constructed and compiled from different household surveys by Claessens (2006) and 
Gasparini et al. (2005). Data on the share of small firms with bank loans and on perceived firm 
financing constraints come from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). The WBES 
is a unique database of firm-level surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 for over 10,000 firms in 
81 countries.
11  The survey includes a broad variety of firms of different ownership structures, 
sectors, legal forms, and – most importantly – different sizes; 80% of the surveyed firms are 
small or medium-sized, with fewer than 500 employees.  Aside from questions on the actual use 
of bank loans, firm managers were asked to rate whether access to finance was an obstacle to the 
                                                 
9 We are grateful to Patrick Hohonan for this suggestion. 
10 In the case of firm financing obstacles we place less emphasis on prediction since the obstacles measure used is 
based on firm perceptions and is intrinsically unobservable.   
11 For a detailed discussion of the survey see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002).    13 
 
operation and growth of their firm.  Responses vary between a rating of one (no obstacle), two 
(minor obstacle), three (moderate obstacle) and four (major obstacle). 
  Table 3B shows the country-level correlation between our outreach indicators and the 
survey-based measures of the percentage of households with bank accounts and the share of 
small firms with bank loans. The share of households with bank accounts is positively and 
significantly correlated at 1% significance level with the geographic and demographic branch 
and ATM indicators and with the loan and deposit per capita ratios. Also, as expected the share 
of households with bank accounts is negatively correlated with the loan and deposit income 
ratios, but in the case of the former the pairwise correlation is not statistically significant.  The 
share of small firms with bank loans is significantly correlated with branches, ATMs and loans 
per capita and with ATMs per square kilometer. However, the share of deposits per capita and 
the deposit income ratio are not significantly correlated with the share of small firms with bank 
loans.  
To assess the power of our outreach indicators in predicting the use of financial services 
by households, we regress the share of households with bank accounts (Household share) on the 
log of number of deposit accounts per capita (Deposits per capita) and the log of number of 
branches per square kilometer (Branches per km
2), with robust standard errors in parentheses:
12 
Household share = 0.493+ 0.186 log(Deposits per capita) + 0.055 log(Branches per km
2) (1) 
         (0.130)  (0.000)                      (0.007) 
 
Estimating equation (1) with 19 observations yields an R
2 of 74%.  Both variables enter 
significantly at the 1% level.  The regression results suggest that a larger number of accounts 
relative to the population and a higher geographic branch penetration are both positively 
associated with more households having bank accounts.  Table 4, columns 1 and 2, present both 
                                                 
12 We include our outreach indicators in log  transformation as they are distributed with fat tails.  14 
 
the actual share of households with bank accounts and the predicted share from regression (1).
13 
The correlation between the predicted share of household and the actual share of households with 
bank accounts is 87%. 
The results in equation (1) remain largely unchanged if we focus separately on the rural 
and the urban share of households with bank accounts as dependent variables. Also, if we focus 
on the share of households in the lowest income quintile with bank accounts and re-run  the 
above regression, both deposits per capita and branches per km
2 enter with the same sign, but 
only deposits per capita is statistically significant. Though preliminary, this evidence might point 
to the importance of alternative distribution channels as opposed to branches to reach low-
income depositors.
14 
A regression of small firm share on the log of the number of loan accounts per 1,000 
people (Loans per capita) and the log of branches per km
2 people yields the following result 
(robust standard errors in parentheses). 
Small firm share = -0.122  + 0.093 log(Loans per capita) +  -0.016 log(Branches per km
2)      (2) 
           (0.595)  (0.008)                       (0.437) 
 
This regression has 26 observations and an R
2 of 30%.  While the log of loans per 100,000 
people is significant at the 1% level, geographic branch penetration does not enter significantly. 
Table 4, columns 3 and 4, present both the actual share of small firms with bank loans and the 
predicted share from regression (2).
15 The correlation between the predicted share of small firms 
with bank loans and the actual share is 54%.  Given the limited sample of firms surveyed by the 
                                                 
13 To avoid that the predicted value falls below zero or above one, we use a tobit regression to predict the share of 
households with bank accounts.  The coefficients and significance levels are almost the same as in the OLS 
regression. 
14 These additional estimations are available upon request. 
15 As in the case of regression (1), we use a tobit regression to predict the share of small firms with bank loans.    15 
 
WBES in each country and the lack of census data on firm financing patterns, the predictive 
power of aggregate loan use indicators is more limited than in the case of deposit services.
16 
While the results on the share of households with accounts and the percentage of small 
firms with bank loans are preliminary and have to be interpreted with caution, they show the 
potential usefulness of our aggregate outreach indicators.  In the absence of consistent 
household- and firm-survey based measures, the analysis conducted so far suggests that proposed 
outreach indicators can serve to estimate and update micro-based measures of access which are 
very costly to obtain. 
To assess the relationship between outreach across countries’ and firms’ financing 
obstacles, we conduct the following estimations using firm-level data: 
Fi,k =β 0 + β 1 Outreachi + β 2 Depthi + β 3 X i,k + ε i,k                  (3) 
where Fi,k is the rating of financing obstacles reported by firm k in country i. X is a set of 
country- and firm-level control variables, including regional dummies
17 and dummy variables for 
government-owned and foreign-owned firms, exporters, firms in manufacturing and services 
(with firms in other sectors captured in the constant) and small and medium-sized firms (with 
large firms being the omitted category).   
Given that financing obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with a natural order 
(where higher values indicate larger financing constraints), we estimate equation (3) as an 
ordered probit model.  Because omitted country characteristics might cause error terms to be 
correlated for firms within the same country, we allow for clustered error terms by country.  
Finally, given that we are regressing firm-level variables on country-level outreach indicators, 
we believe that concerns about reverse causality should be of secondary importance. 
                                                 
16 Unfortunately, we do not have information for enough countries on the location of enterprises to run separate 
regressions for rural and urban firms.  
17 We include dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Pacific, the Americas and Europe (including 
Former Soviet Union), with the Middle East and North Africa being the omitted category.   16 
 
Nevertheless, we err on the side of caution and interpret our results as associations, without 
making inferences regarding causation. 
Firm-level results for financing obstacles are shown in Table 5.  The findings confirm the 
expectation that in countries with greater outreach firms report facing lower financing obstacles. 
In particular, we find that the severity of financing obstacles is negatively correlated with the 
presence of physical bank outlets (in particular the ratio of branches per capita, ATMs per capita, 
and ATMs per square kilometer) and the number of loans per capita. On the other hand, higher 
values of the loan and deposit income ratios are positively correlated with financing obstacles. 
These results hold even though we control for the depth of the financial system.  We also find 
evidence that firms in deeper financial systems as measured by private credit to GDP report 
lower financing constraints; however, this result is not robust and varies across different samples 
and depends on which outreach indicator we include. 
As the WBES provides survey responses to more detailed questions on financing 
obstacles, we also estimated regressions using survey responses on: (i) the extent to which firms 
report needing special connections to access finance; and (ii) the degree to which access to long-
term loans are obstacles to firms’ operation and growth.  Our main finding that greater outreach 
is associated with lower financing obstacles is confirmed in those estimations.
18 
  
5.  Which Country Characteristics Are Correlated with Outreach? 
What factors are correlated with the large variations in outreach indicators across 
countries? Do the same variables that explain financial sector depth matter for outreach?  In 
particular, what role do factors such as the level of economic development, the quality of 
institutions, the informational and regulatory environment, the availability of physical 
                                                 
18 In the interest of space, these results are not reported here but are available upon request.  17 
 
infrastructure, the ownership structure of the banking sector, and historical determinants of 
financial sector depth play?  This section explores the empirical relation between our outreach 
indicators and an array of country-level variables previously found to affect financial sector 
depth. In every case, we compare our findings for the outreach indicators with results from 
regressions for financial sector depth, measured by the ratio of credit to the private sector 
expressed to GDP.   
Table 6 provides correlations among the country-level variables we consider.
19 Since 
many of these variables are highly correlated with each other, it is impossible to include all of 
them together without running into serious multicollinearity problems. Thus, in Table 7, we 
perform OLS regressions for each outreach indicator including regional dummy variables and a 
single country-level variable capturing, respectively, the overall level of economic development, 
the quality of legal institutions, the informational and regulatory environment, the availability of 
physical infrastructure, structural features of the banking sector, and historical determinants of 
financial sector depth.
20,21 As in Table 5, we use logs of the outreach indicators to take account 
of the fat tails in their distribution.  Due to the parsimonious nature of our estimations, we 
interpret results as partial correlations and we stay away from making inferences regarding 
causality. 
Our estimations reported in Table 7 yield a number of interesting results. First, a 
country’s level of economic development – as measured by the log of GDP per capita - is 
positively associated with all of our outreach indicators as well as with the measure of financial 
                                                 
19 Appendix Table A.3 presents descriptive statistics for the different country characteristics. 
20 Similar to previous studies on the determinants of financial development (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1997; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, 2003; and Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer, 2006) we do not 
include GDP per capita in all estimations because this variable tends to be highly correlated with most of the 
regressors that capture specific aspects of development, giving rise to multicollinearity problems that complicate the 
interpretation of results.  
21 We also ran regressions of the outreach indicators on log of area and log of population.  While log of area only 
enters significantly and negatively in the regressions of geographic branch and ATM penetration, the log of 
population does not enter significantly in any regression.   18 
 
sector depth. Second, financial sector outreach and depth indicators are positively associated 
with the quality of the overall institutional environment. We measure the latter by using the 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) Governance Index, which averages six sub-indices 
measuring rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality. All of the outreach indicators and the ratio of 
private sector credit to GDP are significantly correlated with the measure of governance.
22  
Third, when it comes to the impact of the contractual and informational environment of 
credit markets, we observe some differences in the results for depth and outreach. While both 
outreach and depth indicators are correlated with the credit information environment and to a 
lesser extent (in the case of outreach) with the cost of contract enforcement, the specific rights of 
creditors appear only to affect financial sector depth but not outreach. We capture the 
informational environment through a Credit Information Index from the World Bank Doing 
Business database that measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of credit 
information available through either public or private bureaus. Higher values of the index 
(ranging from 1 to 6) indicate a stronger informational environment. The Cost of Contract 
Enforcement (also from the Doing Business Database) measures the official cost of going 
through court procedures, including court costs and attorney fees where the use of attorneys is 
mandatory or common, or the costs of an administrative debt recovery procedure, expressed as a 
percentage of the debt value. Finally, Creditor Rights is an index developed by Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006), following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998), that ranges from 0 to 4, with higher numbers indicating stronger creditor rights.  The 
credit information index is associated with the standard measure of financial sector depth as well 
as with all of the outreach indicators except for the deposit-income ratio. The cost of contract 
                                                 
22 Using alternative indicators such as Rule of Law, compiled by ICRG, or Property Right protection, collected by 
the Heritage Foundation, yields similar results.  19 
 
enforcement is negatively associated with the private credit to GDP ratio, the branch and ATM 
ratios, as well as the ratio of deposit accounts per capita but, surprisingly, has no impact on the 
loan outreach ratios. Finally, the creditor rights variable has a significant impact on the financial 
sector depth measure, but fails to enter significantly in any of the regressions for the outreach 
indicators with the exception of geographic ATM penetration. 
Fourth, the ownership structure of the banking sector appears to have a consistent effect 
on the extent of financial sector depth but less so on the degree of outreach. Government and 
foreign bank ownership are measured by the share of banking assets held by government-owned 
and foreign-owned banks, respectively. This data comes from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001). 
Both the presence of government-owned banks and the participation of foreign banks in the 
system are negatively associated with depth. The share of government-owned banks in the 
system appears to have a negative impact on the access indicators – the branch and ATM ratios – 
but is not significantly correlated with the loan and deposit indicators. On the other hand, the 
presence of foreign banks is only negatively and significantly associated with the loan and 
deposits per capita indicators. Thus, the outreach regressions do not robustly support frequently 
upheld view that government-owned banks help improve outreach, or the assertion that  foreign-
dominated banking sectors are characterized by having a narrower reach, due to foreign banks’ 
tendency to cherry-pick the best and often wealthiest customers.   
Fifth, we uncover some differences in the association between certain historical factors 
and outreach vis-à-vis depth. In particular, we examine the role of initial endowments, legal 
origin and religion, which previous studies have found to affect financial sector depth. We find 
that consistent with previous studies, endowments (captured here by countries’ absolute latitude) 
are positively correlated with depth but less so with outreach, since regressions yield significant 
associations for only three of the eight outreach indicators. In particular, the demographic branch  20 
 
and ATM indicators are positively associated with absolute latitude, while we find a negative 
and significant coefficient on the deposit-income ratio.  
We also find some differences in the correlation of legal origin and religion with depth 
and outreach. Regarding legal origin, the literature has found that economies with legal 
institutions based on the French Civil Code tend to be less financially developed than those that 
originated from the British Common Law. Our regressions including dummies distinguishing 
between countries of French, German, Socialist, Scandinavian, and British legal origin (the 
omitted category) support this result when it comes to depth (although in our sample of countries 
French legal origin is not significant), but not strongly in the case of outreach. In fact, French 
legal origin dummy is never significant in any of the regressions and has the wrong sign in some. 
Further, the legal origin dummies enter jointly significantly in some, but not in all outreach 
indicator regressions.
23 Similarly, while previous studies have found that countries that are 
predominantly protestant tend to be more financially developed than catholic societies (Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003), the evidence is less robust when it comes to the outreach indicators. Yet, the 
religion dummy variables enter jointly significant in many regressions and countries that are 
predominantly Muslim or follow other religions, appear to have less outreach than 
predominantly Protestant countries.  
Finally, indicators of physical, in particular, communications infrastructure are positively 
associated with banking sector outreach and breadth.  Better infrastructure reduces the cost of 
banking service delivery and makes the extension of bank outlets more cost-effective, thus 
increasing the access to and use of banking services.  We include the ratio of Telephone 
                                                 
23 These F-tests area available upon request.  21 
 
mainlines per capita to proxy for the communication infrastructure. Telephone mainlines per 
capita enters significantly in all regressions with the expected sign.
24 
While our results on the determinants of banking sector outreach vis-à-vis depth are 
interesting, they have to be interpreted with caution.  In the absence of a more structural model, 
we are silent on whether our results reflect the effects of demand or supply factors and on the 
causality chain between banking system outreach and other country characteristics. 
 
7.  Conclusions  
This paper introduces a new set of banking sector outreach indicators – measures of the 
access to and use of deposit and lending services.  While admittedly crude, they are the first such 
indicators for a broad cross-section of developed and developing countries.  They are an 
important complement to indicators of the depth and efficiency of financial systems commonly 
used in the finance literature.  This paper conducts a number of “reality checks” to test the 
validity of the proposed indicators. First, we show the predictive power of our indicators in 
tracking more costly to obtain micro-level indicators of outreach such as the share of households 
with bank accounts and the percentage of small firms with bank loans. Second, we verify that 
that our indicators relate to measures of financing constraints as expected: firms report facing 
less severe financing obstacles in countries with better outreach. Finally, the paper looks into the 
determinants of financial outreach vis-à-vis depth.  
The indicators introduced in this paper should be seen as a first attempt at developing 
consistent and comparable cross-country indicators of banking system outreach. Ultimately, 
though, estimating the proportion of the population that has access to and uses financial services, 
identifying obstacles to access, and designing policies to overcome these obstacles and expand 
                                                 
24 We also tried an indicator of transportation infrastructure, rail km per area, with the same results.   22 
 
access, will require a combination of different data compilation efforts and methodological 
approaches. Some of these efforts are already underway. Specifically, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez-Peria (2006) use bank-level data to assess the degree to which there are barriers to 
banking across countries associated with fees and other costs and requirements to use deposit, 
loan, and payment services. Furthermore, Claessens and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) propose to 
undertake detailed household level surveys across a large number of countries to develop more 
detailed measures of access at the household level. This of course is a timely and costly exercise. 
In the mean-time, as discussed above, the aggregate outreach indicators described in this study 
might be useful to measure access to and use of financial services across countries..   23 
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TABLE 1: Branch and ATM Penetration Across Countries 
Geographic branch (ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 1,000 square kilometers. Demographic branch (ATM) penetration 
refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 100,000 people. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a survey of bank regulators. The 
questions asked were as follows: number of Branches – “How many bank branches do deposit money banks have (combined for all banks) in your 
country?”  Number of ATMs – “How many ATMs (automated cash withdrawal machines) are there in your country”  Data sources are in Appendix 
A.1. and A.2. Country ordering for each indicator is included in parentheses; higher numbers in parentheses reflect lower values of the indicators. 
 








Private Credit to 
GDP  
GDP per capita 
 
Albania  2.45 (63)  2.11 (85)  2.74 (62)  2.37 (76)  .  1,933 
Argentina  1.40 (76)  10.01 (39)  2.09 (65)  14.91 (50)  0.205  3,381 
Armenia  8.23 (43)  7.59 (55)  1.49 (68)  1.37 (78)  0.076  915 
Australia  0.77 (83)  29.86 (15)  1.66 (66)  64.18 (14)  0.879  26,062 
Austria  52.47 (14)  53.87 (2)  84.95 (15)  87.21 (7)  1.025  31,202 
Azerbaijan  3.90 (54)  4.11 (71)  .  .  .  865 
Bahrain  135.21  (5) 13.48  (31) 269.01  (5) 26.83  (31) 0.576  10,791 
Bangladesh  47.46 (17)  4.47 (67)  0.61 (77)  0.06 (89)  0.245  376 
Belarus  2.28 (67)  4.79 (64)  2.41 (63)  5.06 (67)  0.070  1,770 
Belgium  181.65 (3)  53.15 (3)  229.28 (6)  67.09 (12)  0.773  29,205 
Belize 1.67  (73)  14.67  (27)  .  .  0.543  3,583 
Bolivia  0.13 (95)  1.53 (90)  0.40 (81)  4.80 (69)  0.558  894 
Bosnia  3.15 (59)  3.86 (72)  4.38 (58)  5.36 (65)  .  1,682 
Botswana  0.11 (97)  3.77 (73)  0.27 (84)  9.00 (59)  0.163  4,290 
Brazil  3.05 (60)  14.59 (28)  3.72 (60)  17.82 (40)  0.346  2,788 
Bulgaria  9.81 (39)  13.87 (29)  21.09 (34)  29.79 (26)  0.149  2,538 
Canada  1.56 (74)  45.60 (7)  4.64 (57)  135.23 (1)  0.967  26,380 
Chile  1.98 (70)  9.39 (43)  5.06 (55)  24.03 (32)  0.694  4,591 
China  1.83 (71)  1.33 (93)  5.25 (54)  3.80 (70)  1.236  1,094 
Colombia  3.74 (55)  8.74 (47)  4.10 (59)  9.60 (57)  0.262  1,747 
Costa Rica  7.52 (45)  9.59 (42)  10.07 (45)  12.83 (52)  0.240  4,365 
Croatia  18.62 (27)  23.36 (19)  31.96 (27)  40.10 (23)  0.416  6,356 
Czech Republic  14.73 (29)  11.15 (35)  25.84 (31)  19.57 (37)  0.424  8,375 
Denmark  47.77 (16)  37.63 (10)  66.51 (18)  52.39 (17)  1.100  39,429 
Dominican Rep.  10.83 (36)  6.00 (60)  27.24 (29)  15.08 (49)  0.335  1,821 
Ecuador  4.38 (51)  9.30 (44)  2.97 (61)  6.32 (62)  0.353  2,066 
Egypt  2.45 (63)  3.62 (74)  1.21 (70)  1.78 (77)  0.579  1,220 
El Salvador  14.58 (30)  4.62 (66)  34.89 (24)  11.07 (56)  0.047  2,204 
Estonia  4.85 (49)  15.19 (25)  18.43 (36)  57.7 (16)  0.248  6,210 
Ethiopia  0.28 (88)  0.41 (98)  .  .  0.294  97 
Fiji  2.52 (62)  5.51 (62)  5.69 (52)  12.46 (54)  0.322  2,696 
Finland  3.26 (58)  19.06 (22)  13.55 (41)  79.21 (8)  0.558  31,007 
France  46.94 (18)  43.23 (8)  76.33 (16)  70.30 (10)  0.857  29,267 
Georgia  2.32 (66)  3.14 (78)  0.86 (75)  1.17 (80)  .  768 
Germany  116.90 (6)  49.41 (6)  144.68 (8)  61.16 (15)  1.178  29,081 
Ghana  1.43 (75)  1.60 (89)  .  .  .  375 
Greece  25.53 (22)  30.81 (13)  39.39 (22)  47.55 (20)  0.546  16,203 
Guatemala  11.49 (33)  10.12 (37)  22.93 (32)  20.20 (35)  0.189  2,009 
Guyana  0.12 (96)  3.12 (79)  0.25 (85)  6.50 (61)  .  965 
Honduras  0.46 (87)  0.73 (94)  2.22 (64)  3.56 (72)  0.388  1,001 
Hungary  31.04 (21)  28.25 (16)  32.30 (25)  29.40 (28)  0.309  8,182 
India 22.57  (24)  6.30  (59)  .  .  0.277 563 
Indonesia  10.00 (38)  8.44 (49)  5.73 (51)  4.84 (68)  0.236  971 
Iran  3.40 (57)  8.39 (50)  0.51 (80)  1.25 (79)  0.281  2,061 
Ireland  13.41 (31)  23.41 (18)  27.78 (28)  48.49 (19)  1.020  37,637 
Israel  47.82 (15)  14.74 (26)  61.01 (20)  18.81 (38)  0.859  16,686 
Italy  102.05 (7)  52.07 (4)  131.71 (10)  67.20 (11)  0.750  25,429 
Japan  34.82 (20)  9.98 (40)  396.98 (4)  113.75 (4)  1.115  34,010 
Jordan  5.98 (47)  10.02 (38)  5.60 (53)  9.38 (58)  0.721  1,858 
Kazakhstan  0.14 (94)  2.47 (82)  0.39 (82)  7.01 (60)  0.125  1,995 
Kenya  0.77 (83)  1.38 (92)  0.56 (78)  0.99 (81)  0.258   434 
Korea  65.02 (12)  13.40 (32)  436.88 (3)  90.03 (6)  1.197  12,634  26 
TABLE 1: Branch and ATM Penetration Across Countries (Continued) 
Geographic branch (ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 1,000 square kilometers. Demographic branch (ATM) penetration 
refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 100,000 people. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a survey of bank regulators. The 
questions asked were as follows: Number of Branches – “How many bank branches do deposit money banks have (combined for all banks) in your 
country?”  Number of ATMs – “How many ATMs (automated cash withdrawal machines) are there in your country?”  Data sources are in Appendix 
Tables A.1 and A.2. Country ordering for each indicator is included in parentheses; higher numbers in parentheses reflect lower values of the indicators. 
 








Private Credit to 
GDP  
GDP per capita 
 
Kuwait  11.05 (35)  8.27 (51)  26.32 (30)  19.69 (36)  0.644  14,848 
Kyrgizstan  0.82 (82)  3.11 (80)  .  .  0.041  344 
Lebanon  79.18 (8)  18.01 (24)  73.90 (17)  16.81 (44)  .  4,224 
Lithuania  1.81 (72)  3.39 (75)  15.34 (39)  28.78 (30)  0.128  5,273 
Madagascar  0.19 (92)  0.66 (95)  0.07 (88)  0.22 (86)  0.081  323 
Malaysia  7.39 (46)  9.80 (41)  12.40 (42)  16.44 (47)  1.352  4,164 
Malta  375.00  (2) 30.08  (14) 462.50  (2) 37.09  (25) 1.083  9,699 
Mauritius  71.92  (10) 11.92  (34) 133.00  (9) 22.04  (33) 0.559  4,265 
Mexico  4.09 (53)  7.63 (54)  8.91 (46)  16.63 (45)  0.181  6,121 
Namibia  0.11 (97)  4.47 (67)  0.30 (83)  12.11 (55)  0.438  2,312 
Nepal  2.96 (61)  1.72 (86)  0.15 (86)  0.09 (88)  0.272  237 
Netherlands  163.81  (4) 34.23  (11) 223.02  (7) 46.60  (21) 1.407  31,548 
New Zealand  4.19 (52)  28.04 (17)  7.53 (47)  50.36 (18)  1.101  19,021 
Nicaragua  1.29 (77)  2.85 (81)  1.18 (71)  2.61 (75)  0.424  748 
Nigeria  2.41 (65)  1.62 (88)  .  .  0.136  370 
Norway  3.41  (56)  22.92  (20)  . . 0.870  48,592 
Pakistan  9.10 (41)  4.73 (65)  1.02 (73)  0.53 (85)  0.260  464 
Panama  5.16 (48)  12.87 (33)  6.49 (48)  16.19 (48)  0.922  4,328 
Papua New Guinea  0.20 (91)  1.64 (87)  .  .  0.147  617 
Peru  0.89 (81)  4.17 (70)  1.24 (69)  5.85 (64)  0.248  2,247 
Philippines  21.40 (25)  7.83 (53)  14.52 (40)  5.31 (66)  0.405  989 
Poland  10.25 (37)  8.17 (52)  21.72 (33)  17.31 (42)  0.265  5,487 
Portugal  57.45 (13)  51.58 (5)  121.50 (12)  109.09 (5)  1.318  14,665 
Romania  13.26 (32)  13.76 (30)  12.02 (43)  12.47 (53)  0.073  2,719 
Russia  0.19 (92)  2.24 (83)  0.53 (79)  6.28 (63)  .  3,022 
Saudi Arabia  0.56 (86)  5.36 (63)  1.54 (67)  14.70 (51)  0.554  8,366 
Singapore  636.07 (1)  9.13 (46)  2,642.62 (1)  37.93 (24)  1.159  21,492 
Slovakia  11.33 (34)  10.28 (36)  32.21 (26)  29.21 (29)  0.441  5,922 
Slovenia  2.14 (69)  2.19 (84)  64.56 (19)  66.14 (13)  0.352  13,383 
South Africa  2.22 (68)  5.99 (61)  6.49 (48)  17.50 (41)  0.689  3,530 
Spain  78.90 (9)  95.87 (1)  104.18 (14)  126.60 (2)  0.992  20,343 
Sri Lanka  20.41 (26)  6.87 (57)  10.91 (44)  3.67 (71)  0.274  965 
Sweden  4.74 (50)  21.80 (21)  6.43 (50)  29.56 (27)  0.830  33,586 
Switzerland  70.54 (11)  37.99 (9)  131.10 (11)  70.60 (9)  1.589  42,138 
Tanzania  0.23 (89)  0.57 (96)  0.07 (88)  0.17 (87)  .  275 
Thailand  8.71 (42)  7.18 (56)  20.69 (35)  17.05 (43)  1.044  2,309 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  23.59 (23)  9.22 (45)  52.44 (21)  20.49 (34) 
 
0.404 7,769 
Turkey  7.81 (44)  8.50 (48)  16.54 (38)  18.00 (39)  0.171  3,365 
Uganda  0.67 (85)  0.53 (97)  0.90 (74)  0.70 (83)  0.051  245 
Ukraine  . . 0.78  (76)  0.93  (82)  . 1,024 
United Kingdom  45.16 (19)  18.35 (23)  104.46 (13)  42.45 (22)  1.301  30,278 
United States  9.81 (39)  30.86 (12)  38.43 (23)  120.94 (3)  1.628  37,388 
Uruguay  1.23 (79)  6.39 (58)  .  .  0.517  3,308 
Venezuela  1.28 (78)  4.41 (69)  4.81 (56)  16.60 (46)  0.110  3,319 
West Bank-Gaza  18.33 (28)  3.27 (76)  18.17 (37)  3.24 (74)  .  1,026 
Zambia  0.21 (90)  1.52 (91)  0.09 (87)  0.65 (84)  .  413 
Zimbabwe  1.11 (80)  3.27 (76)  1.15 (72)  3.38 (73)  0.235  634  27 
TABLE 2: Use of Loan and Deposit Services Across Countries 
Loan (deposit) accounts per capita refer to the number of loans (deposits) per 1,000 people. Loan (deposit) – income ratio refers to the average size of 
loans (deposits) per GDP per capita. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a survey of bank regulators. The questions asked were as 
follows: Number of Loans – “How many loans are there in your country right now that have been issued by deposit money banks?  (Please include 
loans from deposit money banks to individuals, businesses and others, including home mortgages, consumer loans, business loans, trade loans, student 
loans, emergency loans, agricultural loans, etc.)”  Value of Loans – “What is the total value of these loans?  (Please specify currency and units.)  
Number of Deposits – “How many deposit accounts are there at deposit money banks in your country right now?  (Please include all current (checking) 
accounts, savings accounts and time deposits for businesses, individuals and others.)”  Value of Deposits – “What is the total value of these deposits?  
(Please specify currency and units.)”  Data sources are in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2. Country ordering for each indicator is included in parentheses; 
higher numbers in parentheses reflect lower values of the indicators. 
Country  Loan accounts per 
capita 
Loan-income ratio  Deposit accounts 
per capita 
Deposit-income ratio  Private Credit to 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
 
Albania  4.42 (43)  15.41 (4)  161.25 (47)  2.75 (9)    1,933 
Argentina  154.19 (16)  1.77 (37)  368.73 (37)  0.58 (29)  0.205  3,381 
Armenia  41.23 (39)  1.93 (34)  111.38 (49)  1.00 (22)  0.076  915 
Austria  647.64 (4)  1.84 (36)  3,119.95 (1)  0.26 (45)  1.025  31,202 
Bangladesh  54.73 (31)  5.22 (16)  228.75 (43)  1.60 (16)  0.245  376 
Belgium  59.47 (29)  21.09 (2)  3,080.31 (2)  0.38 (41)  0.773  29,205 
Bolivia  9.53 (41)  27.89 (1)  40.63 (53)  5.81 (5)  0.558  894 
Bosnia  114.09 (18)  3.19 (24)  429.40 (32)  1.87 (13)  .  1,682 
Brazil  49.59 (35)  6.18 (13)  630.86 (25)  0.40 (39)  0.346  2,788 
Bulgaria  73.85 (26)  4.24 (20)  1,351.37 (16)  0.26 (45)  0.149  2,538 
Chile  417.74 (8)  1.60 (38)  1,044.82 (22)  0.46 (34)  0.694  4,591 
Colombia  .  .  612.21 (26)  0.42 (37)  0.262  1,747 
Czech Republic  .  .  1,922.83 (9)  0.42 (37)  0.424  8,375 
Denmark  450.99 (7)  2.09 (33)  2,706.07 (3)  0.22 (49)  1.100  39,429 
Dominican Rep.  50.10 (34)  6.71 (11)  719.52 (24)  0.10 (52)   
0.335 
1,821 
Ecuador  77.09 (25)  2.63 (29)  419.54 (34)  0.63 (28)  0.353  2,066 
El Salvador  126.89 (17)  0.39 (43)  456.69 (30)  0.12 (51)  0.047  2,204 
Fiji 67.09  (28)  4.75  (18)  444.42  (31) 1.13  (21)  0.322  2,696 
France  .  .  1,800.84 (11)  0.40 (39)  0.857  29,267 
Greece  776.48 (1)  0.83 (41)  2,417.64 (5)  0.29 (43)  0.546  16,203 
Guatemala  45.79 (38)  3.19 (24)  403.54 (35)  0.55 (30)  0.189  2,009 
Guyana  .  .  571.03 (27)  1.37 (18)  .  965 
Honduras  67.27 (27)  6.13 (14)  287.27 (41)  0.74 (25)  0.388  1,001 
Iran  48.19 (36)  2.91 (27)  2,249.28 (6)  0.04 (54)  0.281  2,061 
Israel  709.90 (3)  1.58 (39)  .  .  0.859  16,686 
Italy  328.15 (11)  2.35 (32)  975.64 (23)  0.47 (33)  0.750  25,429 
Jordan  80.39 (23)  8.20 (9)  465.48 (29)  1.41 (17)  0.721  1,858 
Kenya .  .  69.98  (51)  6.26  (4)  0.258  434 
Lebanon  93.42 (20)  9.13 (7)  382.53 (36)  6.65 (3)  .  4,224 
Lithuania 58.86  (30)  3.65  (23) 1,166.45 (19)  0.21 (50)  0.128  5,273 
Madagascar  4.38 (44)  18.35 (3)  14.46 (54)  9.31 (1)  0.081  323 
Malaysia  328.97 (10)  2.95 (26)  1,250.10 (17)  0.92 (23)  1.352  4,164 
Malta  407.21 (9)  6.24 (12)  2,495.81 (4)  1.22 (20)  1.083  9,699 
Mauritius  207.13 (15)  2.75 (28)  1,585.99 (14)  0.53 (31)  0.559  4,265 
Mexico  .  .  309.57 (39)  0.46 (34)  0.181  6,121 
Namibia  80.74 (22)  5.16 (17)  422.96 (33)  1.27 (19)  0.438  2,312 
Nicaragua  95.61 (19)  2.49 (30)  96.12 (50)  4.70 (7)  0.424  748 
Norway  .  .  1,610.78 (13)  0.23 (48)  0.870  48,592 
Pakistan  21.93 (40)  14.26 (5)  191.84 (45)  2.63 (10)  0.260  464 
Panama  297.84 (12)  5.32 (15)  .  .  0.922  4,328 
Papua New Guinea  .  .  119.77 (48)  2.48 (11)  0.147  617 
Peru  77.92 (24)  2.45 (31)  316.19 (38)  0.74 (25)  0.248  2,247 
Philippines  .  .  302.05 (40)  1.77 (14)  0.405  989 
Poland  773.87 (2)  0.33 (44)  .  .  0.265  5,487 
Romania  .  .  1,207.88 (18)  0.25 (47)  0.073  2,719 
Russia  54.11 (32)  4.23 (21)  1,892.28 (10)  0.07 (53)  .  3,022 
Saudi Arabia  47.45 (37)  7.73 (10)  214.13 (44)  2.28 (12)  0.554  8,366 
Singapore  513.23 (6)  3.84 (22)  1,670.88 (12)  1.62 (15)  1.159  21,492 
Spain  556.48 (5)  1.91 (35)  2,075.96 (7)  0.44 (36)  0.992  20,343 
Switzerland  .  .  1,985.84 (8)  0.29 (43)  1.589  42,138 
Thailand  247.87 (14)  4.56 (19)  1,423.12 (15)  0.83 (24)  1.044  2,309 
Trinidad and Tobago  .  .  1,073.48 (21)  0.35 (42)  0.404  7,769 
Turkey  264.51 (13)  0.65 (42)  1,114.23 (20)  0.68 (27)  0.171  3,365 
Uganda  5.79 (42)  10.74 (6)  46.64 (52)  3.93 (8)  0.051  245 
Venezuela  93.04 (21)  1.02 (40)  486.74 (28)  0.48 (32)  0.110  3,319 
West Bank-Gaza  50.15 (33)  8.25 (8)  253.99 (42)  4.91 (6)  .  1,026 
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TABLE 4: Predicting Use of Financial Services with Outreach Indicators 
Column (1) presents the share of households with bank accounts, using data from Claessens (2006) and Gasparini et al. (2005). Column (2) 
presents the predicted share of households with bank accounts calculated using the coefficients from the regression of column 1 on the log 
number of deposit accounts per 1,000 people and the log number of branches per 1000 square kilometer. Column (3) presents the share of 
surveyed small firms (firms with 5 to 50 employees) with bank loans, using data from WBES. Column (4) shows   the predicted value of the 












































Albania   0.146  0.038  0.132  Lithuania   0.470  0.198  0.361 
Argentina   0.249  0.536  0.457  Madagascar         
Armenia 0.089  0.144  0.000  0.302  Malaysia   0.560  0.520  0.501 
Austria  0.814  0.821   0.532 Malta    0.872   0.454 
Bangladesh   0.349  0.111  0.299  Mauritius   0.725    0.418 
Belgium  0.927  0.871   0.285 Mexico  0.250  0.274  0.071  
Bolivia  0.003  0.500  0.237  Namibia  0.284  0.151    0.439 
Bosnia    0.318   0.414 Nicaragua  0.047  0.065  0.357  0.413 
Brazil 0.427  0.385  0.280  0.336  Norway    0.564     
Bulgaria  0.002 0.590  0.156  0.354  Pakistan  0.122 0.233  0.222  0.243 
Chile   0.455  0.690  0.547  Panama      0.538  0.498 
Colombia 0.412  0.391  0.400    Papua  New  Guinea    0.040     
Czech Republic   0.676  0.125    Peru    0.201  0.600  0.400 
Denmark  0.991  0.794   0.499 Philippines    0.357  0.429  
Dominican Republic    0.479  0.619  0.316  Poland      0.280  0.577 
Ecuador 0.218  0.331  0.412  0.372  Romania    0.586  0.151   
El Salvador    0.411  0.469  0.398  Russia    0.436  0.195  0.391 
Fiji    0.312   0.368 Saudi  Arabia    0.125   0.361 
France 0.963  0.725  0.529    Singapore    0.838  0.600  0.467 
Greece  0.789  0.745   0.562 Spain  0.916  0.775  0.565  0.511 
Guatemala 0.165  0.376  0.524  0.306  Switzerland    0.763     
Guyana 0.137  0.202      Thailand    0.593    0.471 
Honduras    0.157  0.441  0.397  Trinidad and Tobago    0.595  0.894   
Iran    0.626   0.332 Tunisia         
Israel       0.543  Turkey    0.542  0.456  0.479 
Italy 0.704  0.657  0.545  0.456  Uganda    0.014    0.170 
Jordan    0.367   0.370 Venezuela    0.292  0.323  0.410 
Kenya 0.100  0.032      West  Bank-Gaza    0.317    0.307 
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TABLE A.1: Indicator Data Appendix 
Country  Source  Data Current as of:  Comments 
Albania  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Argentina  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Housing loans, information provided separately, not included 
Armenia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Australia Regulator  Survey  June  2003   
Austria Regulator  Survey 
 




Number of Loans and Value of Deposits reflect domestic loans and deposits only, Value of 
Loans and Number of Deposits reflects both domestic and foreign loans and deposits  
Number of ATMs: European Payment Cards 
Azerbaijan  National Bank of Azerbaijan 
Republic 
October 2004  Number of Branches: Bulletin of Banking Statistics - Table 4.1 Number of branches of 
operating credit organizations 
Bahrain  Regulator Survey  December 2002  Number of Branches current as of December 2003. Loan and deposit information for full 
commercial banks only 
Bangladesh  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Belarus  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Belgium  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Belize  Central Bank of Belize  December 2003  Number of Branches: Quarterly Financial Information of Commercial Banks 
Bolivia Regulator  Survey 




Number of Loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Number of ATMs: Payment System Statistics in Countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 1997-2001 - Table 6: Cash Dispensers, ATMs and EFTPOS Terminals 
Bosnia  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Botswana  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Brazil  Regulator Survey  June 2003  Number of Loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Bulgaria  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Canada Bank  for  International 
Settlements 
Canadian Bankers Association 
December 2003  Number of Branches: Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries 
Figures for 2003 – Table 5: Institutional Framework 
Number of ATMs: ABM Market in Canada, May 2004 
Chile  Regulator Survey  December 2003   





Number of ATMs: “High Growth Special Situation” March 24, 2005 
Colombia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Costa Rica  Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos 
December 2001  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs: Payment System Statistics in Countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1997-2001 Table 4 – Institutional Framework and Table 6 
– Cash Dispensers, ATMs and EFTPOS Terminals 
Croatia  Regulator Survey  September 2004   
Czech Republic  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Denmark  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Dom. Rep.   Regulator Survey  December 2004  Number of Loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Ecuador  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Egypt  Central Bank of Egypt 
Egypt Ministry of 
Communications and 
Information Technology 
July 2003  Number of Branches: “Egyptian Banking Sector Reform Policy: Areas of Future Actions” 
Number of ATMs: “E-Business – A New Way of Doing Business” 
El Salvador  Regulator Survey  March 2004   
Estonia  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Ethiopia Ethiopian  Consulate  General 
California 
December 2001  Number of Branches: Country Facts 3.8 Financial Institutions 
Fiji  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Finland  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs current as of December 2002 
France  Regulator Survey  December 2004  Number of ATMs current as of December 2003, Value of Loans, Number of Deposits, 
Value of Deposits current as of June 2004 






Number of Branches: Bulletin of Monetary and Banking Statistics January-February 2005, 
Table 3.1. Financial Institutions 
Number of ATMs: Julija Mosina “Lithuanian Representatives Visited Caucasian 
Countries”, September 22, 2003 
Germany  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Ghana  Bank of Ghana  December 2001  Number of Branches: Major Banks Branches Network Nationwide 
Greece  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Number of ATMs current as of December 2002, Number of Loans, Value of Loans, 
Number of Deposits and Value of Deposits current as of January 2003 and reflect loans and 
deposits to domestic enterprises and households 
Guatemala Regulator  Survey 
Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos 
December 2003   
Number of Branches: Sistemas de Compensación y Liquidación de Pagos y Valores en 
Guatemala Junio 2004 – Table A4: Marco Institucional 
Guyana Regulator  Survey 




Number of Deposit Accounts: Payment System Statistics in Countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1997-2001 – Table 4: Institutional Framework 
Honduras  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Hungary Regulator  Survey 
National Bank of Hungary 
December 2003   
Number of ATMs: Eva Keszy-Harmath “The Payment Card Business in Hungary 2003” 
India  Reserve Bank of India  June 2004  Number of Branches: Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2003-2004 November 29, 
2004 
Indonesia Bank  Indonesia  December  2001 
January 2005 
Number of Branches: Annual Report 2003, Table 8.1 
Number of ATMs: Offices of Financial Institutions and Cash Services – ATMs 
Iran  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Ireland  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Israel Regulator  Survey     
Italy  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
       34 
 
TABLE A.1: Indicator Data Appendix (continued) 
Country  Source  Data Current as of:  Comments 





Number of ATMs: Ulric Rindebro “Spain: Ahead of the ATM Curve” April 5, 2002 
Jordan  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Kazakhstan Bank  for  International 
Settlements 




Number of Branches: Payment Systems in Kazakhstan, Table 5: Institutional Framework  
Number of ATMs: Payment Cards, Table 2 
Kenya  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Korea  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Kuwait  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Kyrgizstan Kyrgizstan 
Development Gateway 
November 2004  Number of Branches: List of Commercial Banks in the Kyrgyz Republic and their Branches 
Lebanon  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Lithuania  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Madagascar  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Malaysia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Malta  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Mauritius  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Mexico  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Namibia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   




Number of Branches: Banking and Financial Statistics No. 43, Commercial Banks B9 
Number of ATMs: Binam Raj Ghimire “ATMs vs. Tellers: ATMs in Nepali Banks” 
Netherlands  Regulator Survey  December 2002   




Number of Branches and Number of ATMs: Comparison of Payment Methods (Non-Cash) 2000-
2004 
Nicaragua  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Nigeria  Central Bank of Nigeria  December 2003  Number of Branches: Major Economic, Financial and Banking Indicators, Table 2 – Financial 
and Banking Indicators 
Norway  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Pakistan  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Panama  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Papua NewGuinea  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Peru  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Philippines  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Poland  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Portugal  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Romania  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Russia Regulator  Survey 




Number of ATMs: Russian Payment System 
Saudi Arabia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Singapore  Regulator Survey  January 2005  Number of loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Slovak Republic  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Slovenia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
South Africa  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Spain  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Sri Lanka  Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 
December 2003  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs: Annual Report 2003 Section 10.8 and Table 10.12 
Sweden  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Number of Branches, Number of ATMs, Number of Deposits and Value of Deposits current as of 
December 2002 
Switzerland  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Tanzania Regulator  Survey 




Number of Branches: Registered Commercial Banks 
Thailand  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Trinidad Tobago  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Turkey  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Uganda  Regulator Survey  September 2004   
Ukraine US  &  Foreign 
Commercial Service 
February 2001  Number of ATMs: Olena Stephanska, David Hunter and Bela Babus “Card Payment Systems in 
Ukraine” 
United Kingdom  Regulator Survey  December 2002  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs current as of December 2001 







Number of Branches (FDIC-insured only): “Branching Continues to Thrive as the US Banking 
System Consolidates” October 20, 2004 
Number of ATMs: ATM Fact Sheet 
Uruguay  Banco Central de 
Uruguay 
September 2004  Number of Branches: Superintendencia de Instituciones de Intermediación Financiera Red Física 
de las Empresas de Intermediación Financiera Número de Sucursales 
Venezuela Regulator  Survey 






Number of ATMs: Payment System Statistics in Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
1997-2001 – Table 6: Cash Dispensers, ATMs and EFTPOS Terminals 
West Bank and 
Gaza 
Regulator Survey  April 2005   
Zambia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Zimbabwe  Regulator Survey  December 2004  Number of ATMs current as of April 2005 
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TABLE A.2: Country Characteristics - Definition and Sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source  Date 
Private credit to GDP  Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a 
share of GDP 
World Bank Financial Structure 
and Economic Development 
Database 
5 Year Average 
1999-2003 
Log of population  Natural log of population in millions of people  World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
2003 
Log of area  Natural log of area in 1000s squared kilometers  World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
2003 
GDP per capita  GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates / Total population  World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
2003 
Governance index  Average Score on Six Governance Indicators (Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law, Control of Corruption) – Data from Surveys of Enterprises, Citizens 
and Experts. High score corresponds to better governance. 





Scored on 0-6 Scale, Score Increasing with Availability of Credit 
Information, 
World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators 
2004 
Creditor rights  Index of creditor rights following La Porta et al. (1998). A score of one is 
assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in 
laws and regulations: (1) there are restrictions such as creditor consent or 
minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization, (2) secured 
creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is 
approved, (3) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed of other creditor such as government 
or workers, and (4) management does not retain administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 (weak) 
to 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Djankov et al. (2006)  2003 
Cost to enforce 
contract (Percent of 
Debt) 
Total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, court fees  World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators 
2004 
Share of assets in 
government-owned 
banks 
Percentage of banking system assets in banks 50%+ owned by government  World Bank Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Database 
Published 2004, 
Data from 2001 
Share of assets in 
foreign-owned banks 
Percentage of banking system assets in banks 50%+ owned by foreign 
entities 
World Bank Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Database 
Published 2004, 
Data from 2001 
Telephone mainlines 
per capita 
Total telephone mainlines / Total population  World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
2002 
French legal origin  Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin.  La Porta et al. (1998)   
British legal origin  Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of British Common Law 
origin. 
La Porta et al. (1998)   
German legal origin  Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin.  La Porta et al. (1998)   
Latitude  Absolute value of the latitude of a country, scaled between 0 and 1.  La Porta et al. (1998)   
Catholic  Dummy equal to 1 if the largest proportion of the population is Catholic or 
Orthodox Christian. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003)   
Muslim   Dummy equal to 1 if the largest proportion of the population is Muslim.  Stulz and Williamson (2003)   
Other   Dummy equal to 1 if the largest proportion of the population is Atheist, 
Buddhist, Hindu, Indigenous, or Jewish. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003)    
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